Friday, September 07, 2012

MPC contest gives us a chance to build Light Armored Infantry Battalions again.

Lockheed Martin Havoc sporting an Elbit 30mm RWS.
BAE SuperAV.
The Marine Personnel Carrier Contest.

First.  This should be a two vehicle race.  Lockheed Martin's Havoc versus BAE's SuperAV.  Sorry SAIC.  I don't see the Terrex fully meeting requirements and I don't think that you would be able to get enough production stateside to jump through the Congressional hoops that will be placed in front of you to be competitive.

General Dynamics.  You guys are pathetic.  You're basically hiding your vehicle from public view, in other competitions you're mailing it in with tired, old, busted designs that are not worthy of being considered and the last competition that you did win (the Brits contest) was based on a pure price shoot out.  The ASCOD is not competitive with the CV90.  You know it, we know it and the Brits knew it.  You won simply because you low balled everyone and they ignored the requirements that they laid out.  I expect the same with the Marine Personnel Carrier Contest and for that reason alone I would disqualify you.

But all this brings me back to the Havoc and the SuperAV.

We have a tremendous opportunity here.

We can re purpose our LAR Battalions and make them what they were originally and should be again.  Light Armored Infantry Battalions.

It will require a couple of things to happen.  First we'll have to divest ourselves of the LAV-25.  I don't see that as a problem.  We need a more capable vehicle that can carry more infantry anyway.  We also don't need a force that performs the Army's Calvary mission of screening and reconning by fire.  We're a truly combined force.  Aviation assets (to include UAVs) can perform that mission.  What we need are highly mobile infantry that can zoom around battlefields in a distributed battlefield and provide reinforcements to our infantry battalions mounted in AAVs during deliberate attacks.

What this will require in the end is a better explanation of our force requirements.  More billets will have to be alloted to the newly formed LAI Battalions to get them up to strength.  We will also need to explain to the powers that be that because the EFV was cancelled and because we're upgrading the AAV and buying a cost effective ACV, we no longer need a stop gap.

We will be buying a full allotment of ACVs.  About 1000.  And will need a full allotment of MPCs to replace the LAV-25.

Congress will go for it especially if the jobs from the production of these vehicles is in the US and we properly present the idea of this making the Marine Corps more combat effective than our current formations.

Cancelling the JLTV should help pay for some of the bill.  Not buying $50 dollar rifle slings should help too.

7 comments :

  1. One of the things from my perspective that makes the infantry centric Marines effective is the focus on recon units paving the way. It's been said the time spent on reconnaissance is seldom wasted and given a more lethal and networked battlefield in my view this maxim is not less true today.

    So it's not clear to me the Marines giving up dedicated light armored cavalry battalions is a good idea? For purposes of this discussion lets assume so and then ask does the Corp need light mechanized infantry battalions?

    That's really unclear to me. I had thought the plan the Corp had for a light (JLTV), medium (MPC), and heavy (ACV) infantry carrier was rather problematic on myriad levels. Eliminating JLTV might be a great idea but the Corp is still going to have some form of light infantry carrier. The issue is thus how many types of armored infantry carriers the Corp should operate?

    For a USMC making an effort to cut the number of tactical aircraft it operates down to one (F-35) it's not clear it makes sense to increase the number of types of infantry carriers it operates?

    Moreover, does a MEU now deploy with an MPC platoon similar to the LAV platoon they presently operate? Does the MEU in fact need it's LAV plat to lead the way for it's AAV/ACV mounted infantry company and tank platoon less than it needs an additional light mechanized infantry platoon?

    I'd suggest the Corp might be better served with one type of armored infantry carrier and that it should be the ACV. Supposedly the Corp wants to refocus on being a from the sea expeditionary force. I'm not sure a niche vehicle like the MPC really fits here?

    On another level I'm not remotely satisfied with an armored infantry carrier that breaks up the 13 man squad. The result will be either you need many more MPC's or these proposed light mechanized battalions use a smaller squad size.

    Finally in this budget environment I think the Corp needs to focus on one new infantry carrier and it should be the one focused on the core missions and again that's ACV. If the corp really does need more mechanized infantry, or even dedicated battalions, then I suggest using ACV and/or an APC version minus the turret. That preserves squad integrity and simplifies the support chain. The entire MPC program from my perspective was created because EFV was too expensive and another cheaper vehicle was needed as a supplement. Make ACV affordable and forget about MPC. Just my opinion.

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  2. i concede everyone of your well expressed points. i just don't think that the budget will allow for as many ACVs as we would need to implement your idea.

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  3. Sol it's a fair point but if we can't afford enough ACV's do we really want scarce dollars going for MPC's? After EFV one might be forgiven for thinking that affordability would be a central aspect for ACV? We can only hope they make it work.

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  4. but thats the real pig in the blanket. the only reason why the MPC came to be is because the EFV got to be so unaffordable that we couldn't buy enough. then the EFV got cancelled and we're suppose to buy an affordable ACV but if that's the case then why is the USMC going forward with the MPC!

    its a circular argument but no one wants to explain it.

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  5. Once a program gets started it acquires a life of it's own. As I've mentioned before I really don't know how the Corp envisions using the MPC. I had thought they going to operate the AAV battalion mixed with some EFV and MPC and thus some units would operate MPC instead of EFV. The resulting number of Marine battalions that could be carried under armor would thus not change only which vehicle. If that was indeed the plan it was never explained how many MPC's were going to be assigned to carry a platoon or company given they only carry 8 or 9 dismounts?

    MPC is probably continuing as insurance against ACV. If ACV turns out to be successful and affordable MPC should be canceled. Even if not I personally question the entire rationale in the Corp operating an APC that can't carry a squad? How much do you save buying a cheaper vehicle when you need twice as many?

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  6. not sure about your last but consider this. every modern military has that problem to some degree or another depending on their APC. the Bradley is notorious for being more fighting vehicle than transport...Stryker the same...so the problem continues. i think even the NAMER is limited when it comes to carrying an Israeli Rifle Squad. (don't they have like 11?>)

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  7. The issue about limited dismounts really came about with the replacement of the APC by the IFV a few decades ago. The USMC kept it's large squad and with the EFV and ACV planned on an IFV that did not compromise the infantry squad. The US Army, after a decade of combat, has concluded it's next IFV will carry 9 dismounts vs the current 6 in the Bradley. I believe Israel uses a 9 man squad which the Namer can carry.

    The doctrine with the IFV was that it replaced platoon and company level machine guns and brought enough additional firepower to allow the dismounted infantry to be supported by the vehicles. It wasn't an unreasonable doctrine but when you have to move out of direct support and/or sight of the vehicles the doctrine breaks down and you're left with fewer dismounts. Moreover, oftentimes the promotion path comes from learning the vehicle so the emphasis in many mechanized units is the IFV with less concentration on other tasks.

    It doesn't appear to me the Corp has these issues in that the AAV and the vehicles designed to replace it carry a reinforced squad and are not permanently assigned. Thus while the Corp does want it's AAV replacement to be more heavily armed, an IFV vs an APC, it's not creating a true mechanized infantry formation whose first priority is to enable tank forces to continue their advance. This isn't to say the Corp isn't able to operate in that manner but rather that first and foremost ACV is an infantry carrier and will operate over a range of tasks.

    So given the Corp has avoided all the compromises of operating IFV's with limited dismounts why jump into the issue with MPC? Better to avoid it entirely.

    As an aside I've yet to see any proposed structure for an MPC company although I do believe the proposal was to put these companies within the existing assault amphibian battalions back when the plan was to have limited numbers of EFV companies. It would seem to me almost twice as many MPC's are required vs AAV/ACV and thus compared to the current AAV company size these would either be twice as large or require twice as many units. Either solution requires more personnel compared to an AAV/ACV unit.

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